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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETER :MART JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
RANGHILD V. JORGENSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8618 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for divorce commenced by the plain-
tiff-respondent. The trial court .awarded the divorce to 
the defendant-appellant on her counterclaim, making a 
distribution of certain properties to the parties and pro-
viding that the floral business be continued and man-
aged by the respondent husband. The defendant has ap-
pealed from the portion of the judgment awarding prop-
erty. Appellant in her brief refers to the parties as they 
were designated in the trial court and respondent will 
do likewise. 
The defendant's statement of facts is limited to that 
necessary to show the facts upon which she was awarded 
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2 
the divorce. To adequately state plaintiff's position :t 
few additional facts are required. 
The marriage between the plaintiff and defendant com-
menced to deteriorate in the years 1938 and 1939. At 
that time a person by the name of Mrs. Tronier was 
working part time for the parties in the floral business 
(R. 57). The defendant, Mrs. Jorgensen, took exception 
to the woman, apparently believing plaintiff was show-
ing her too much attention. Plaintiff denied any im-
proper attentions or interest in Mr.s. Tronier. The de-
fendant apparently did not take the matter seriously be-
cause she testified that, except for a minor quarrel, her 
married life was very happy until 1953 (R. 98). The 
plaintiff testified that this early disturbance was caused 
by defendant's constant nagging and accusations against 
him of improper conduct (R. 30, 57). However, he ad-
mitted more or less peaceful years until 1953. During 
these years the parties went on a trip to Denmark to 
visit family and friends and on that occasion met the 
~irs. Nielsen referred to in defendant's brief (R. 60-61). 
In 1953 the defendant made a trip to Denmark to visit 
her aging parent.s and on her return events occurred 
which ultimately led to the divorce (R. 58, 98). 
During the tiine defendant was in Denmark plaintiff 
had occasion to see nr rs. Nielsen. Plaintiff regarded her 
as a mutual friend of him and his wife, socially and per-
sonally, because of cmnn1on interest .and background. 
On defendant's return from Denn1ark she testified that 
plaintiff was to meet her in New York to visit friends, 
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but that he cancelled out on her. Plaintiff states that he 
was ready and willing to go, but received word from her 
that she wanted to come straight home (R. 64). On de-
fendant's rerturn to Salt Lake she was told by her children 
of the matters relating to plaintiff and 1\irs. Nielsen and, 
as a result, she asked plaintiff about his new girl friend 
(R. 102). Plaintiff regarded defendant's statement about 
his new girl friend as a renewal of the nagging and accu-
sations of improper conduct which had occurred in the 
past. 
Nothing of importance appears in the record until 
August 1955 when the defendant testified she overheard 
a telephone conversation between plaintiff and Mrs. 
Nielsen (R. 103). The testimony as to this conversation 
as between the plaintiff and Mrs. Nielsen is in conflict 
(R. 76, 103, 146). 
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, de-
scribed the breakdown of the marriage in expressive 
terms, charging them with mutual loss of interest, each 
becoming self-centered, irritable and suspicious. The 
memorandum decision did not indicate fault or the party 
entitled to the divorce (Mem. Dec. page 1). 
All of the property of the partie·s was .accumulated 
during the marriage and consists of insurance policies, 
the floral business and property, a home on Walker Lane 
and about fifteen acres of undeveloped residential prop-
erty. The plaintiff com1nenced the floral business in 
1932 and during most of their married life defendant 
assisted in the business. Her activities were limited to 
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waiting on the retail customers and other tasks normally 
expected of a saleswoman (R. 95, 132). While plaintiff 
and defendant at times discussed the business, she took 
no pam in the management, purchasing or the wholesale 
part of the business (R. 96, 131-132). Prior to the mar-
riage defendant worked for the National Biscuit Com-
pany. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS A 
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE ·COURT'S DISCRETION. 
2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS A 
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE .COURT'S DISCRETION. 
Defendant complains that the court has not acted 
within its statutory authority, and that the decree is so 
incomplete and indefinite that it has no finality. The 
argument advanced is that a partnership is being main-
tained notwithstanding the expulsion of one of the part-
ners and that one joint tenant is being deprived of the 
right to destroy the tenancy. The difficulty with de-
fendant's argument is that no consideration is given 
to the nature of the aetion and is an atte1npt to solve the 
problem by hard and fast rules relating to property 
rights. 
The principal asset of the parties is the flor.al busi-
nN·,s which has been conducted as a partnership. The 
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business is operated on premises leased for a specified 
term of years, with an option of renewal. The Hyland 
Floral, as it is called, is the result of the business com-
menced by plaintiff in 1932. While it has the label of 
partnership and has been treated as such in its records 
and accounts, it is entirely incident to the marriage. The 
defendant did not become a partner by reason of a cash 
contribution, because she had .a special knowledge or skill 
relating to the floral business or for any reason other 
than as the wife of the plaintiff. The defendant admit-
ted that her husband exercised the same proprietory atti-
tude as is usual of men in their own business affair.s, and 
as might be expecied of a man having the paternal, 
thrifty, hardheaded business approach of Danish people. 
This is the premise to which the statutory provisions 
should apply. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides 
that where a divorce is granted the court may make such 
order in relation to the property as may be equitable. 
It does not say or require the court to bring about the 
dissolution and finally and irrevocably settle every prop-
erty right between the parties. A situation analogous 
to the instant case has been before the court in a prior 
case. In that case the parties had accumulated farming 
property during the marriage and this Court was .asked 
by the wife therein to distribute to her one-half of the 
property, necessitating the sale of the property which had 
provided a livelihood during the long period of the mar-
riage. This Court refused to divide the property, recog-
nizing that it was difficult of division in a manner to pro-
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teet the rights of both parties and the continuation of the 
property under the defendant husband's control would 
properly protect and be to the best advantage of both. 
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214. In the 
instant case the business is conducted on leased premises 
and its sub.stantial value is not in the tangible business 
property, but in its value as a going concern. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, further 
provides that the court n1ay make subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to property as may be reason-
able and proper. By virtue of this provision the Court 
has the right to retain jurisdiction over property which, 
in the be.st interests of the parties, should not be distri-
buted, and affords a practical means of protecting the 
wife from improvident acts, the consequences of serious 
illness and other unforeseeable events which might make 
or tend to make her a public charge. We believe that 
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, supr.a, rejects any proposition that 
all property must be distributed without regard to the 
be:st interests of the parties or in face of the proposition 
that a liquidation would destroy the value of the prop-
erty and seriously harm earning capacity. 
The only evidence relating to the value of the Hy-
land Floral is the amount of income which the business 
was able to produce. The sale value of the tangible prop-
erty was not even suggested. It is the only 1neans of 
livelihood of the plaintiff and the only future security 
available to the defendant. The interest of the State of 
Utah in the divorce action dictates .against its destruction. 
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The only que,stion involved, therefore, is whether or not 
the order n1ade relating to the property constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY WAS 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 
Defendant's statement of the facts is directed to the 
~stablishment of the plaintiff as the guilty party. It is 
argued that this label of guilt entitles the defendant to 
an award of property according to her personal stand-
ards of equity. Equity has many aspects. The plaintiff 
~ontinued to build an estate which he knew would benefit 
defendant over a period of seventeen years of marital 
trouble. Equity does not require that his means of live-
lihood be destroyed because he did not secrete property 
or devise methods of limiting or defeating defendant's 
rights. The parties have no serious physical or mental 
health problem, their children have been reared and are 
of age and it is not shown that there has been any happi-
ness in the marriage for several years, and neither party 
is suffering any extraordinary sacrifice or loss of devo-
tion or care. The decree as entered provides the best 
method available to maintain the standards of living and 
needs of both parties. In considering the general fac-
tors relating to a property division, the parties are equal. 
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265; MacDonald 
v. JfacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066. 
The defendant's notion of equity is simply that she 
does not see why she should not be permitted to pick and 
choose as to amount and kind of property. As pointed out 
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in the statement of facts, the marriage began to come 
apart in 1938. It required approximately seventeen years 
to complete the process of disintegration. The nature of 
the guilt is reflected in the words of the trial court finally 
ending the marriage : 
"So, here, we see no outlet except to terminate 
the marital status by dissolving and terminating 
the marriage contract." (~fern. Dec. page 2). 
The court did not delineate guilt, the situation was hope-
less and termination was all that was left. The order 
relating to the property resulted in an equal division be-
tween the parties. The circun1stances which surround the 
litigation are found behind the decree awarding the di-
vorce and, in the last analysis, show equal guilt in the 
destruction of the marriage relation. 
Defendant's argun1ent relating to the inequitable 
distribution of the property should have been directed to 
the judicial rather than a personal discretion. It has been 
s.aid by a respected court that discretion is not a judge's 
sense of moral right, neither is it his sense of what is 
just, and he is not clothed with a dispensing power or 
privilege to exercise his individual notion.s of abstract 
justice, but principles of laK are to be ascertained and 
followed, and justice is adn1inistered on settled and fixed 
principles. R~tgg v. State, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 633, 278 App. 
Div. 216. 
This Court has stated that discretion does not mean 
happy or fortuitou.s choice, but a discretion guided by 
circun1stances surrounding the litigation. Broadbent et 
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al. v. Gibson et al., 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939. That must 
mean principles of law. 
In the exercise of its judicial discretion the tr1al 
court performed solemn acts. It entered its memorandum 
decision, the findings of fact, the conclusion.s of law and 
the decree. These acts were the result of an application 
of the legal principle that in a divorce matter an order 
relating to property should be consistent with the inter-
ests of the parties and in a way to properly protect their 
rights. Unless the trial court's judgment, under all of 
the circumstances, is so wrong that a manifest injustice 
and inequity results, the decree should be sustained. 
In Lawlor v. Lawlor, 121 Utah 201, 240 P.2d 271, this 
Court .set forth its policy in reviewing judicial discretion: 
"This court is reluctant to modify a divorce 
decree because usually the evidence is contradic-
tory and the trial court having seen and heard 
the witnesses is more able to determine their 
credibility than we are. Also, in the absence of an 
abuse of discretion, we do not disturb the prop-
erty division." 
This policy has been reaffirmed in many cases. Callister 
v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 944; Blotter v. Blotter, 
1 Utah 2d 351, 266 P. 2d 1018; Tremayne v. Tremayne, 
116 Ftah 483, 211 P. 2d 452; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 
supra; Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P. 2d 
252; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. 2d 277; 
Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872; Dahlberg v. 
Dahlberg, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 
P.2d 977; Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Com-
pany, decided April1, 1957 (unreported). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted within its statutory authority 
relating to the property of the parties, and the decree 
with respect thereto is an exercise of the sound discre-
tion of the court, being c.alculated to give the defendant 
an equal share of all the property of the marriage, while 
making provision to secure her against unfavorable cir-
cumstances not foreseeable and, at the same time, making 
its po.ssible for plaintiff, .as well as defendant, to re-
construct a new life. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS, 
MATTSSON & EYANS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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